UN Programme of Action on Small Armas and Light Weapons
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Working Paper by Spain

I. Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects: Stockpile management, including physical security measures.

- Spain considers that physical security and stockpile management (PSSM) is the basic measure to prevent illicit trade of small arms and light weapons (SALW), ammunition or explosives. PSSM is crucial for preventing accidents with severe consequences over civilian populations and environment.

- Proliferation of SALW is a source and a multiplier of internal instability. In order to prevent their proliferation, States have the obligation to establish security measures that exercise control over their SALW and ammunition. Those measures should be comprehensive in scope and in responsibility. Scope, referring to exercising control over inventories of arms and ammunition located in depots, as well as over the transportation, movement and transfer of SALW. Responsibility, relating to all the civil sectors involved (legislators, the military, security forces, manufacturers and civilians) in the concern for proliferation. SALW non-proliferation requires a whole-of-government approach.

- In conflict and post-conflict situations, comprehensive stockpile security measures are critical for conflict resolution and stabilization. However, in those situations, the need for international assistance increases the role of peacekeeping missions. Thus, these missions should include in their mandates stockpile management, surplus destruction, training of personnel and other SALW non-proliferation measures, with specific funds assigned to them, if possible.

- Spain welcomes Resolution 2117 and supports a constructive debate on the practical measures for its implementation as well as on the coordination of the UN Program of Action measures.

- Spain considers that the human factor is still essential in addressing the problem of SALW proliferation. The security of stockpiles should lie in well-trained and experienced professionals who have undergone a rigorous selection process, proficiency tests and have a deep knowledge of procedures, norms, regulations and international standards.

- Spain encourages all States to pass legislation in order to facilitate women's access to training and to occupy positions relating to the security sector, including the field of security of stockpiles. This takes into account UN Security Council Resolution 1325, which provides equal opportunity without discrimination by gender and follows selection criteria for suitability.
In the field of stockpile management and physical protection, the use of advance technology should have added value. Complementing the human factor, technology optimizes the security of stockpiles, inventory control and movement of SALW and ammunition. In addition, it serves to strengthen communications, thus decreasing response times and improving cooperation among all the actors committed to security and SALW non-proliferation.

Other factors that facilitate access to illicit SALW and ammunition include: Differences in legislation among States regarding the life-cycle of weapons, easiness in reactivating some weapons, corruption by some institutions and manufacturers, which encourages international black markets as well as the simplicity of converting blank guns into real firearms. Therefore, Spain suggests the development and implementation of life-cycle management procedures that prevent the reactivation of out-of-life SALW.

During the life-cycle management of weapons, ammunition and explosives, States are obliged to comply with its general duty to protect the environment, applying general principles such as environmental impact assessments and the obligation to protect ecosystems and species.

Spain considers that the illicit trade of ammunition is an integral part of the unlawful use of small arms and light weapons. The illicit trade of ammunition presents different challenges from those of small arms and light weapons, but the dependence of SALW on ammunition and on their shorter life span justifies a comprehensive approach that includes ammunition.

II. Consideration of the implementation of the International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons

The Programme of Action has brought significant progress in the fight against illicit trafficking of SALW, but there is still some way to go. Continued efforts are needed to implement the Programme of Action, particularly in the development and implementation of legislation in SALW control with regard to registering, marking, export-import and transit. This includes drafting biennial reports, establishing national points of contact and developing National Action Plans.

Spain considers that those leading the illicit arms trade exploit the vulnerabilities of the legal arms trade. Therefore, we consider unavoidable to explore the coordination of the POA with those provisions of the Arms Trade Treaty related to Small Arms and Light Weapons by also measuring the ratifications or accession progress and supporting UN Trust Fund Facilities (UNSCAR).

Marking and Tracing are key mechanisms for national, regional and/or international efforts to prevent, combat and eradicate illicit small arms and light weapons. In this regard, it is necessary to strengthen mechanisms to exchange information, particularly on national marking systems at the time of manufacture as well as on standard procedures relating to seized unmarked SALW.
States should consider making a greater use of existing international mechanisms of information exchange, including international structures of information exchange. Spain encourages exploring the development, when possible, of integration modules between online information technologies and those in INTERPOL iArms, ATF eTrace and EUROPOL.

States should improve the exchange of information with regard to seizures of arms in order to deal with vulnerabilities and enhance opportunities for investigations and prosecutions, particularly with a focus on regional cooperation.

III. International Cooperation and Assistance for the full and effective implementation of the Programme of Action and the International Tracing Instrument, including:

a) Capacity building, including training;

b) Transfer of technology and equipment

Illicit trade in conflict zones has global consequences; however, repercussions on the surrounding countries are critical. For this reason, we consider crucial to explore the role of regional organizations, as they are better aware of the different problems and unique characteristics of each area. Specifically, we deem necessary to discuss the ways and means that regional and sub-regional organizations can improve regional cooperation, and in particular, cross-border cooperation and information-sharing mechanisms.

Likewise, it is important to have a discussion on improving synergies between UN and regional organizations as may occur through Regional Centres for peace and disarmament or by the creation of Regional Expert networks, which can assist in the preparation and development of National Plans.

Spain considers that illicit trade in small arms and light weapons is one of the most complex threats to peace, international security and human development because it constitutes the common nexus between conflicts, organized transnational crime and terrorism. On this basis, we support the discussion on improving accession and ratification to the legal instruments against Terrorism and Transnational Organized Crime and those measures that enhance the link, when appropriate, to the Firearms Protocol.

Spain considers that the use of national reports provides an opportunity to identify assistance requests. National reports are not only a means to display activities but also to identify the areas or expertise where States can contribute internationally as well as being a basis for identifying opportunities for capacity building, such as training.